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[So F. No. 17248. In Bank. Oct. 28,1947.] 
ELEVATOR OPERATORS AND STARTERS' UNION, 
LOCAL 117, et aI., Respondents, v. FREDERICK NEW-
MAN, Appellant. 
[So F. No. 17577. In Bank. Oct. 28, 1947.] 
FREDERICK NEWMAN, Appellant, V. ELEVATOR 
OPERATORS AND STARTERS' UNION, LOCAL 
117, et aI., Respondents. 
[l] Appeal-Moot Questions.-The issues involved in a contro-
versy as to whether a former treasurer of a labor union was 
entitled to reinstatement to his position became moot, on ex-
piration pending appeal of the term of office for which he was I 
elected, except for his claim of back salary for that part of 
his term of office that was unexpired when the union eeased 
to pay his salary. 
[Ill Associations-Officers-Removal. -.An unincorporated associ-
ation exists to carry out policies formulated by its members, 
and it has the right to remove officers who have lost the con-
fidence of the members or who refuse to conform to the poli-
eies established by it. 
[3] Id. - Officers-Removal.-The policy that prompted the aban-
donment of the common-law rule restricting the removal of 
eorporate directors prior to expiration of their specified terms, 
; and the adoption of Civ. Code, § 310(1), authorizing their 
~. ' .•.. : .. removal by a vote of the shareholders, applies with equal foree 
[~~. to officers of unincorporated associations. 
,< [4] Id.-Oonstitution and By-Laws-Amendment.-An amendment 
to the eonstitution and by-laws of a building service employ-
ees' union providing that only members employed as elevator 
operators shall be allowed "to hold office in the union with 
the exception of members tllling a full ti;ue office" and a1ao 
that it shall take e:IIect 30 days after its passage applies to 
the unexpired terms of office as well as to officers taking office 
in the future. 
[5] Id. - 01!lcers-Removal-Right to Salarf. - The fact that a 
union has the power to remove an officer from office prior to 
expiration of the specified term for which he was elected, doee 
McX. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 21; [2,3,5] AI!-
eociations, § 3; [4] Associations, § 4; [6] Mandamus, § 17; [7] 
Pleading, § 70; Set-o:II and Counterclaim, 114; [8] Pleading, § 70; 
~91 Aasociat!ons, § 12. 
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not necessarily deprive him of the right to the salary for the 
1IIlexpired term, since the exercise of such power of removal 
eould eonstitute a breach of a contraot of employment. 
[8] Kandam1l8 - Subjects of OOlltral- OOlltnct Bilhts.-Manda-
m1l8 does not lie where there is no eause of action for rein-
.utement to an oftioe, but merel7 • elaim for damages for 
breach of eontract. 
i ['I] Pleadin,- Oroaa-complaint: Bekif and Oountercla.im. - Sub-
ject Katter.-In an action by a labor union against its former 
treasurer to recover possession of uuion books and records, 
defendant's claim for back salary on the grounds that he had 
• right to be reinstated as treasurer and that the union had 
breached a contract of employment, was a proper subject of 
a counterolaim and also a cross-complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., 
11438, 442.) 
[8] Id. - Oross-complaint - Transaction.-The facts surrounding 
the cause of action and not the form of the complaint are de-
terminative of what constitutes the transaction within the 
rules as to cross-eomplaints. 
[9] Associa.tions-mtervelltion of Oourta.-A. former treasurer of 
a labor union seeking reinstatement to his position and back 
aalar;y for the unexpired term did not fail to emaut his rem&-
dies within the union before seeking judicial relief where, 
pursuant to the union's eonstitutioll and by-laws, he had ap-
pealed to the general exeoutive board from the union deci-
sion vaeating his oSee, where his appeal was unconditioJ1ally 
denied, and where it was apparent that an appeal to the same 
board for damages would be futile. 
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Frank T. Deasy and 
Mylvain J. Lazarus, Judges. First judgment reversed with 
directions; other judgment aftlrmed. 
Aetion by labor union and others to secure possession of 
1IDion books and records, and proceeding in mandamus to com-
pel union to admit petitioner to oftlce of treasurer and pay 
him the sa1aq of such oftlce. Judgment for plainti1ls in Am 
ense reversed with directions; judgment against petitioner in 
second ease aftlrmed. 
[8] See 18 OaLJ'ur. 791; 34 Am.Jur. 849. 
[9] Ezhaustion of remedies within labor union as eondition of 
resort to eourts by expelled member, note, 168 A.L.B. 1462. See, 
I also, a OaL.Ju. 354; 4 Am..Jur. 472; 31 Am..Jur. 8~ 
-) 
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Melbert B. Adams for Appellant. 
Albert Picard and Francis McCarty for Respondents. 
Charles P. Scully, as Amicus Curiae, on behalf of ResponeJ. 
ents. 
TRAYNOR, l.-Bespondent union (hereinafter called the 
union) is an unincorporated association whose constitution 
and by-laws make it an integral part of the Building Service 
Employees' International Union. Appellant Newman has 
been a member of the union since its organization. Be was 
elected its first treasurer, and served in this capacity on a 
part-time basis until the present controversy. Be was last 
elected on December 14, 1943, for a two-year term expiring 
December 81, 1945. Section 9 of article 4 of the constitution 
and by-laws of the union pro rides that the treasurer shall be 
elected for a two-year term, and that all oftlcers of the union 
aha1l hold oftlce until their successors are duly elected and 
qualliied. During his last term appellant received a salary 
~ $70 per month, paid to him until May 15, 1944. 
, . On April 11, 1944, the members of the union adopted an 
amendment to the constitution and by-laws providing, "Only 
members who are employed as elevator operators under the 
jurisdiction of the union • • • shall be allowed to hold office 
in the union with the exception of members filling a full-time 
oftice. This section to become e1fective (30 days) after passage 
by the membership." Previously there was no requirement 
that officers of the union be employed as elevator ope~ 
~ra. Appellant, who was not employed as an elevator oper.; 
ator, opposed the adoption of the amendment and Jefused 
ihereafter to take such employment. A controversy arose be-
tWeen him and the union as to whether he was entitled to hold 
the. oftice until the end of the term for which he was elected. 
:Without complying with the requirement established by the 
amendment. Upon the expiration of the 80-day period the 
'union declared appellant's oftlce vacant and eeaaed to pay 
appellant the salary of treasurer. On May 23, 1944, a new 
election was held and another member of the union was elected 
treasurer. Appellant refused to yield to the election of a new 
treasurer, maintaining that until the end of his term he was 
the duly elected and qualified treasurer of the union and as 
an incident to his oftice was entitled to draw the sa.laq ~ 
II c:.»-aI 
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tached thereto. He refused to give up possession of the books, 
records, and papers of the union in his custody. Officers of 
the union, acting on behalf of the union, brought an action 
against him to recover them and $5,000 damages for deten-
tion of its property. Appellant:6led a counterclaim for pay-
. ment of his salary. He also :6led a cross-complaint praying 
for payment of his salary, for declaratory relief that he was· 
the duly elected, acting, and qualified treasurer of the union, 
and for an injunction to prevent the union from paying the 
treasurer's salary to the newly-elected treasurer. The trial 
court gave judgment for the union for the possession of the 
books, records. and papers in appellant's custody. It refused , 
to award damages and struck appellant's counterclaim and 
cross-complaint. It stated in its findings: "That none of the 
matters set forth in the counterclaim or cross-complaint of 
the defendant constitutes a counterclaim or cross-complaint 
to the amended complaint herein; that subdivision (e) of 
section 3 of the by-laws of the plaintitf union reads as follows: 
'The treasurer shall keep all records required to be kept by 
him in files provided for the purpose by the union. Such:6les 
shall be kept in the office of the union.' That without regard 
to whether said defendant is or is not the treasurer of said 
union the said plaintitf is entitled to judgment herein for the 
recovery of the personal property set forth in the amended 
complaint herein; that the said counterclaim or cross-eom-
plaint have been stricken out by this court without prejudice 
to further procedure." Defendant and cross-eomplainant 
appeals. 
Since the judgment in the action brought by the union faDed 
to detennine whether appellant was the treasurer of the union 
for the remainder of his tenn, appellant petitioned for a writ 
of mandamus to compel the union to admit him "to the use 
and enjoyment of the office of treasurer of respondent union 
and to compel payment unto petitioner of the salary due him 
as such." The trial court issued the alternative writ, which 
was discharged upon trial of the ease. In its findings the trial 
court stated among other things that the amendment requiring 
that part-time officers of the union be employed as elevator 
operators atfeeted the tenure of petitioner's office, that this 
amendment was a. "legal and valid amendment of the consti-
tution and by-laws of said union," and that petitioner was 
"not entitled to the sum of seventy (70) dollars or any other 
amount per month or ~ amount at all from May 15, 1944. to 
) 
\ 
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the date of judgment herein or for any other period." Peti-
tioner appeals. His appeals from the judgment in the man-
damus proceeding and from the judgment in the first action 
have been consolidated. 
[1] Since the term for which appellant was elected expired 
on December 13, 1943, there is no longer any controversy as 
to whether he is now entitled to reinstatement as treasurer of 
the union. The issues have therefore become moot except for 
appellant's claim for back salary for the part of his term of 
office that was unexpired when the union ceased to pay his 
salary. 
Appellant contends that the back salary is due him on the 
ground that he was the treasurer of the union until the end 
of the term for which he was elected, that he was entitled to 
reinstatement to his office, and that as an incident to his right 
to reinstatement he was entitled to receive the salary con-
nected with the office. 
In his pleadings as well as in his briefs on appeal appellant 
contended that the amendment is invalid on the ground that 
it was not proposed to the members of the union in the manner 
required by the constitution and by-laws of the union and the 
international union. The trial court found in the mandamus 
proceeding, however, that on April 11, 1944, the union "duly 
and regularly amended" its constitution and by-laws by 
adopting the amendment in question and that petitioner was 
estopped from objecting to the method of adoption thereof on 
the ground that for many years he had "acquiesced in said 
method of amendment and voted for and assisted in the adop-
tion of amendments of the said constitution and by-laws in 
the said same manner, and that by amendments made in the 
same manner the term of office of treasurer was increased 
from one (1) year to two (2) years while petitioner held said 
office, and in the same manner an amendment was adopted \ 
pursuant to which respondent union increased the salary of i 
petitioner during his term of office and said petitioner accepted 
the increased salary and did not contend that the amend-
ment pursuant to which the union so acted was not valid or 
make any objections to the adoption thereof." In the course 
of the appellate proceedings appellant waived his objection 
to the manner of adoption of this amendment. We assume, 
therefore, that the amendment was properly adopted. 
Appellant relies on cases holding that an officer of an 
uninoorporaed association elected for a specified term of 
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ofIlce cannot be removed from hisofllce upon charges brought 
against him without having been given notice of the charges 
and an opportunity to reply thereto. (Be1I.tleg v. Hurley, 
222 Mo.App. 51 [299 S.W. 604]; Goller v. Stubenhaw, 77 
Mise 29 [184 N.T.S. 1001, 1050]; see C.J.S.) Respond. 
ents contend that it is immaterial whether appellant could 
have been removed from. his ofIlce for alleged misconduct 
without adequate cause and proper investigation, since the 
amendment merely placed a condition upon his continuance 
in ofIlce that was reasonably connected with the purposes 
of the union, and that rights to an office of an unincorporated 
association are subject to the right· of the association to 
amend its by.laws to alter the terms and conditions of hold· 
ing the office. In Fugure v. MufuG'l Society 01 Sf. /ol6pA, 
4:6 Vt. 362, 368, cited by respondents, the court recognized 
that plaintiff'8 right to a widow's allowance of 25 cents per 
day under the by·laws of an unincorporated association was 
validly limited by an amendment to the by-laws, adopted 
after plaintUf's husband joined the association, whereby a 
ceiling was placed on the amount of allowance available to 
a widow. The court based its holding, however, on the char-
itable character of the allowances, stating that they "were 
derived solely from voluntary assessments upon the members 
of the society .••• And experience might prove that, without 
assessments greater than the members could bear, there 
must . be a limitation to the stipend to the widows." This 
case can hardly be regarded as a precedent with regard to 
rights not based on charitable contributions. In StoAr v. 
San FramMco Mwicol Fund 80ciet1/, 82 Cal. 557, 560[22 
P. 1125], on which respondents also rely, an unincorporated 
association amended its by.laws regarding the period for 
which members were entitled to siekness benefits ~ plain-
ti1! had become m. It was held that plaintiif's right to bene-
fits was a contract right, which under the terms of the con-
tract was subject to changes without his consent, since the 
by-laws reserved the power to the membe1'8 to amend them: 
and that the rule of law allowing such amendments "must 
be held to enter into and form a part of the contract." (82 
I Cal. 557, 560.) The decision in that case was based on the 
/ fact, however, that the by.laws did not specify the period 
/ during which a member was to receive siekness benefits. The 
court clearly distinguished the case from cases in which the 
member had acquired a right to siekness benefits for a speci-
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fied period of time. (82 Cal .. 557, 561-562.) Since appel-
lant's term of oflice was specified in the constitution and by-
laws of the union, there is no basis for applying the holding 
in Stohr v. San Francisco Musical Fund Society. supra. 
Nor do Bowie v. Grand Lodge, 99 Cal. 392 [34 P. 103], or 
Robinson v. Temp'kJr Lodge, 117 Cal 370 [49 P. 170, 59 Am. 
St.Rep. 193], also relied on by respondents, support the con-
tention that a right acquired under the by-laws of an unin-
corporated association can be retroactively defeated by an 
amendment to the by-laws even though the right was definitely 
defined and acquired before the adoption of the amendment 
to the by-laws, and no power was reserved to the members 
either by a special provision in the by-laws or by a rule of 
law to affect that right. (See, also, "Wist v. Grtmd Lodge, 22 
Ore. 271 [29 P. 610, 29 Am.St.Rep. 603] ; 7 C.l.S. 34.) 
[9] There is an important difrerence, however, betweeD 
a right of a member of an unincorporated association under 
the constitution and by-laws of an association to receive bene-
fits and the right of an officer for a specified term to hold 
the oflice to which he was elected. An unincorporated usocia-
tion exists to carry out policies formulated by the majority 
of its members. The right of the members to determine poli-
cies would be vitiated if omcers could continue in oflice even 
though a conflict developed between them and the members 
over policy. If an officer had a vested right to his oftlce, supe-
rior even to the power of the members to amend the ecmsti-
mtion and by-laws, he would represent the association evm 
..... though he opposed the policies of its members or lacked the 
!{ very qualifications the members require as a matter of poHq. 
~, The law does not prevent one who has appointed an agent 
~1 for a specified term from revoking the agency. (Civ. Code, 
f § 2356; Long Beach Drug Co. v. Vnited Drug Co., IS Cal.2d 
.;: 158, 174 [88 P.2d 698, 89 P.2d 3861; Stoll v. Stoll. 5 Cal.2d r: 687, 691 [56 P.2d 226J; 1 Cal.Jur. 702; Rest., Agency, 
f~ § 118 (b).) There is even more reason to allow an unmcor- I 
~ .. porated association to remove oftlcers who have lost the con· 
fidence of the members or who refase to conform to the 
. policies established by the association. [8] Appellant refers 
to the fact, however, that labor unions have grown in strength 
of recent years, and contends that they should have no greater 
power in the removal of oftlcers than corporations have in 
the removal of directors. He relies on the common-law rule 
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that in the absence of a provision in the by-laws authorizing 
the shareholders of a corporation to shorten the term of office 
of directors, they have no power, except for cause, to remove 
directors before the expiration of their specified terms. (Bal-
lantine, Corporations, 2d ed. 434; 2 Fletcher, Cys. Corp., 
§§ 352, 356, 357.) There was no such rule at common law 
with regard to the officers of unincorporated associations. 
There is no reason now to adopt such a rule for such asso-
ciations, for the common-law rule has been changed for cor-
porations in this state. The rule as it applied to corporations 
was criticized as unsound on the ground that "the share-
holders, although the sovereign owners, must submit to the 
control of their corporation being retained by the elected 
directors during their term of office, even though they have 
become entirely unsatisfactory." (Ballantine, ibid., 434.) This 
state abandoned the rule by providing in section 310(1) of 
the Civil Code: "The entire board of directors or any indi-
vidual director may be removed from office by a vote of 
shareholders holding a majority of the outstanding shares 
entitled to vote at an election of directors." Other states 
have adopted similar statutes. (Ballantine, ibid., 435.) The 
policy that prompted abandoning the common-law rule as to 
the removal of corporate directors applies with equal force 
to officers of unincorporated associations. 
[4] Appellant contends that the amendment should be 
interpreted as applying only to part-time officers taking 
office after its passage, since a by-law, like a statute, will not 
be construed to operate retrospectively unless it expressly 
so provides. (See 6A Cal.Jur. 323.) It appears from the 
terms of the amendment, however, that it applies to the un-
expired terms of officers holding office 88 well as to officers 
taking office in the future, for it provides that it shall take 
effect 30 days after its passage and that only members em-
ployed 88 elevator operators shall be allowed "to hold any 
office in the union with the exception of members filling a 
full time office." (Italics added.) Moreover, those who pro-
posed the amendment and assisted in its adoption have con-
:rtrued it 88 applying to officers holding office at the time of 
! the adoption of the amendment 88 well 88 to officers taking 
o1TIP.e subsequently thereto. The two part-time officers be-
sides appellant who were not employed 88 elevator oper-
ators voted for the amendment and resigned during the 
30-day period specified by the amendment. 
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[6] It does not follow, however, that appellant is not 
entitled to back salary because the union had power to remove 
bim from office. Even though he was not entitled to rein-
statement to his office and to his salary as an incident to hold· 
ing the office, the exercise of the power to remove him from 
his office before the expiration of the specified term for which 
he was elected could constitute a breach of a contract of em· 
ployment. As this court said with regard to the revocation of 
the authority of an agent: "Save in the case of an agency 
coupled with an interest, a principal has the power to revoke 
an agent's authority at any time before the agent has com-
pleted performance. (Civ. Code, sec. 2536; 1l'Zanaga/I/, v. Brown, 
70 Cal. 254 [11 P. 706]; Parke v. Frank, 75 Cal. 364 [17 P. 
427]; Blumenthal v. Gooilall, 89 Cal. 251 [26 P. 906] j 1 Cal. 
Jur. p. 705.) A principal may, however, curtail his righ~ of 
revocation by contracting not to revoke the authority for a 
definite time. If the principal does so contract, he still retains 
the power to terminate the agency, and the termination can-
not be prevented by the agent, but a revocation of authority 
within the designated period renders the principal1iable for 
damages for the violation of a legal right of tha :tgent, just 
as in the case of any other breach of contract. (Parke v. 
Frank, supra; BlumenthaZ v. GooilaZl, supra; Ropes v. John 
Rosenfeld', Son" 145 Cal. 671 [79 P. 354]; 8ill v. Oeschi, 167 
Cal. 698 [140 P. 949] j Boehm v. Spreckels, 183 Cal. 239 [191 
P. 5]." (Roth v. Moeller, 185 Cal. 415, 418 [197 P. 62] ; Stoll 
v. Stoll, 5 Ca1.2d 687, 691 [56 P.2d226] ; Long Beach Drug 00. 
v. United Drug 00., 13 Cal2d 158, 174 [88 P.2d 698, 89 P.2d 
386]; see 2 l:lechem, Agency, § 568.) In some states statutes 
empower banks or other private corporations to dismiss ofl\. 
cera or other employees at pleasure. There is a eonftt'ct of 
authority whether such a statute, in the absence of special 
provisions, should be construed to mean that the corporation 
can exercise its power of removal only subject to liability for 
damages to omcers or employees employed for specified terms. 
(Ooa: v. First Nat. Bank, 10 CalApp.2d 302, 305 [52 P.2d 
524] ; In r6 Paramount Publia: Oorp., 90 F.2d 441 [111 A.L.R. 
889] and cases there cited; see Ballantine, Corporations, 2d 
ed. 437; 39 Colum.L.Rev. 353; 50 Harv.L.Rev. 418; 47 Yale 
L.J. 1(Y19. 1081; Unif. Business Corp. Act, § 32.) 
The question arises in the present case whether the rule 
empowering an unincorporated association to remove omcers 
elected for a special term makes the contract of employment 
/ 
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implied in the election to office terminable at the pleasure of 
the association, in the absence of a special contract that the 
officer will be employed for the term for which he was elected. 
There is also the question whether appellant had a right to a 
fixed salary or whether his salary was subject to the discre-
tion of the union. The constitution and by-laws of the union 
provide that ccThe salaries of officera and committees shall, 
upon the recommendation of the Executive Boal'd, be fixed 
And determined by the Union" (Art. IV, § 5.) It is con-
tended that the salaries can be revised upward or downward 
at any time and that since the union could have decided that 
the oftlce should carry no salary, appellant cannot recover 
damages. This court cannot determine these questions on this 
appeal. 
[6] Appellant's claim for back salary was tried only in 
the mandamus proceeding. His claim was based, not on breach 
of contract, but on the theory that he had a right to reinstate-
ment to the office. It ill settled that mandamus does not lie 
when there is no cause of action for reinstatement to a posi-
tion, but merely a claim for damages for breach of contract. 
(I",ins v. (hason, 19 Cal.2d 14, 16 [118 P.2d 812] ; McPher-
son v. City of Los Angeles, 8 Cal.2d 748, 749 [68 P.2d 707]; 
Northrup v. Baynes, 15 Cal.App.2d 665,666 [59 P.2d 1056]; 
Coombs v. Smith, 17 Cal.2d 454, 455 [62 P.2d 3BO); aee 
34 Am.Jur. 849.) 
[7] In the action brought by the union, appellant based 
his claim for back salary in his cross-complaint not only on 
the ground that he had a right to be reinstated as treasurer and 
that back salary was due him as an incident to that right, but 
also on the ground that the union had breached a contract of 
employment. Such a claim was a proper subject of a counter-
claim and a cross-complaint. "Under the 1927 amendments to 
section 438, Code of Civil Procedure, the sole requisites of a 
counterclaim are that it 'must tend to diminish or defeat the 
plaintiff's recovery and must exist in favor of a defendant 
and against a plaintiff between whom a several judgment 
might be had in the action.' Terry Trading Corp. v. Barksy, 
210 Cal. 428 [292 P. 474] ; Luse v. Peter" ante, p. 625 [28 
P.2d 857]. Upon counterclaim a defendant may recover dam-
ages exceeding the plainti1f's demand. (Sees. 626, 666, 857&, 
Code Civ. Proc.) It (Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 693 
[28 P.2d 916]1 see 16 Cal.L.Rev. 363, 366.) In the present 
case appellant's claim for back salary tended to diminish or 
defeat the union'. recovery of money damagea a.llepdq .... 
I j 
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tamed by the detention of its books, records, and papers. Such 
a claim was also a proper subject of a cross-complaint. See-
tion 442 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "Whenever 
the defendant seeks affirmative relief against any party, relat-
ing to or dependent upon the contract, transaction, matter 
••• or accident upon which the action is brought, or affect-
ing the property to which the action relates, he may, in addi-
tion to his answer, tile at the same time, or by permission of the 
court subsequently, a cross-complaint." Respondents contend 
that the amended complaint and the cross-complaint did not 
relate to the same transaction, on the ground that the amended 
complaint merely alleged that the union was the owner of the 
books, records and papers mentioned in the action, that defend-
ant had possession thereof, that he refused to deliver posses-
sion to the union, and that it did not mention that appellant 
was the treasurer of the union or that he was removed from 
his office. [8] It is settled, however, that "The manner in 
which the complaint is drawn is not conclusive. The facts 
surrounding the cause of action and not the form of com-
plaint are determinative of what constitutes the transaction. 
(Hanes v. Ooffee, 212 CaL 777 [300 P. 963] ; Story &; Isham 
Oom. Co. v. Story, 100 Ca1. 31 [34 P. 671]; Terry Trading 
Co. v. Barsky, 210 Cal. 428 [292 P. 474].)" (California Trust 
00. v. Cohn, 214 Cal. 619, 625 [17 P.2d 297]; Marlin v. Hall, I 
219 Cal. 334, 337 [26 P.2d 288].) In the present case the 
facts underlying the action for recovery of the books, records, 
and papers of the union, and for money damages were the 
same as those on which appellant based his claim for baek 
salary, namely, appellant's removal from office and his refusal 
to concede that the union could deprive him of the benefits 
thereof within the specified term for which he was elected. 
The trial court's decision to strike appellant's counterclaim 
and cross-complaint denied appellant a trial of his claim for 
damages for breach of contract. This claim involves issues of 
fact, and we cannot determine the merits of the claim on this 
appeal without depriving the parties of their right to a trial 
of these issues. Moreover, the question whether appellant has 
a claim for damages for breach of contract has not been 
briefed by the parties. The briefs relate only to appellant'. 
right to reinstatement to the office and the claim for back 
salary that would follow from the existence of such right. 
[9] There is no merit in respondent's contention that ap-
pellant baa failed to exhaust his rem.ediea within the um-. I . 
) 
) 
, 
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Article XVI of the constitution and by-laws of the interna-
tional uuion provides that" Any officer or member who has a 
grievance or believes an injustice has been done in any way in 
any local union may appeal to the General Executive Board." 
Pursuant to this provision, appellant appealed from the deci-
sion of the union vacating his office, and his appeal was uncon-
ditionally denied. It would be futile to appeal to the same 
board for damages on the ground that his removal from office 
constituted a breach of contract. (Nissen v. International 
Brotherhood, 229 Iowa 1028 [295 N.W. 858, 141 A.L.R. 598]; 
Lo Blanco v. Cushing, 115 N.J.Eq. 558 [171 A. 778]; Heasley 
v. Operative Plasterers ~ Cement Finishers' International 
Assn., 324 Pa. 257 [188 A. 206] ; see 168 A.L.R. 1473.) 
In case No. S. F. 17577 (mandamus proceeding) the judg-
ment and order denying the motion to vacate the judgment 
are affirmed. In case No. S. F. 17248 (action on behalf of 
the union) the judgment is reversed with directions to allow 
the filing of defendant's counterclaim and cross-complaint and 
to proceed to a trial of the single issue of defendant's claim 
for back salary. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied Novem-
ber 24 194-7. 

